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ABSTRACT
SCHUMPETER REVISITED: FASTER BETTER CHEAPER
AS GROUNDS FOR
ENTREPRENEURIAL SUCCESS AND A PATH TO AN IPO
By
Charles Raymond Olsavsky
April 15, 2019
Current entrepreneurship research focuses on two types of entrepreneurial firms:
(1) the firms that develop innovative novel products or services arising from technological
innovation; and (2) the firms that develop innovative novel products or services arising
from recognition of an opportunity in existing conditions, no type of change required. A
third type of business founder has been largely ignored in the modern entrepreneurship
research - - the founder who enters a competitive market with no novel product or service
that he or she invented. I refer to this founder in a competitive market as a performance
entrepreneur.

This dissertation presents theory to argue that there are high growth

opportunities in certain competitive markets and analyzes the prevalence of performance
entrepreneurs among US IPO firms. Of particular interest is the performance entrepreneur
who enters a new competitive market recently enabled by new technology.
I present theoretical arguments (under a resource based view(RBV)) that the
majority of high growth firms are performance entrepreneurship firms, not firms with
innovative new products. Joseph Schumpeter opined in 1942 that technological advances
were becoming too complex for entrepreneurial firms. Michael Hammer opined through
v

the 1990s and early 2000’s that many business opportunities would arise through efficiency
as a result of technological changes. I utilize these opinions and theories to advance my
theory.
In a stratified research effort, I reviewed SEC filings of over 500 firms that went
through IPOs in the 1995-2015 period. IPO firms are firms very successful firms that have
achieved high growth and are generally considered to be at the pinnacle of
entrepreneurship. My interest is the business ventures pursued by successful firms.
The research showed that over 80% of these firms were performance
entrepreneurship firms, not firms that had developed high technology products or services.
This research is important because it shines a light on an important group of entrepreneurs
who have been largely ignored in the modern entrepreneurship, even though they figured
prominently in the traditional entrepreneurship.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Current Theory That We Know
There is an emphasis in the modern entrepreneurship research on business founders
who have a novel product or service. In the last 15 years, a debate of entrepreneurship
researchers has been whether entrepreneurs “discover” opportunities to start businesses or
whether entrepreneurs “create” opportunities to start businesses (Alvarez et al., 2013;
Alvarez & Barney, 2007). The discover or create debate centers on business founders with
novel products or services.
Concerning the creation process, Alvarez and Barney (2007, p. 15) describe
entrepreneurial opportunities as “created, endogenously, by the actions, reactions, and
enactments of entrepreneurs exploring ways to produce new products or services (Baker
and Nelson, 2005; Gartner, 1985; Sarasvathy, 2001; Weick, 1979).”
Turning to discovery, the discovery process generally involves entrepreneurs who
are able to see new opportunities in the markets that nonentrepreneurs cannot see (Alvarez
& Barney, 2007; Kirzner, 1973). Kirzner refers to the skill to see new opportunities as
“alertness” (Kirzner, 1973, p. 6). The concept of alertness really does not apply to a
business founder entering a competitive market that many see the opportunity for,
especially if her or his plan is simply to perform better than the competition. Thus, (1) the
creation view expressly requires a novel product or service and (2) the discovery view
requires a novel product or service, or some other novelty that was discovered by alertness.
1

In an article published in a leading management journal for theoretical research, the
Academy of Management Review (AMR), Ramoglou and Tsang (2016) propose that the
discover/create debate can be solved by referring to entrepreneurial efforts as actualization
rather than discovery or creation. In doing so, they clarify the requirement of a new product
or service in order for activity to be entrepreneurial. Ramoglou and Tsang (2016, p. 411)
define entrepreneurial opportunity as “the propensity of market demand to be actualized
into profits through the introduction of novel products or services.” Thus, once again a
novel product or service is required in a modern definition concerning entrepreneurship.
Ramoglou and Tsang (2016) note that “entrepreneurship” can include introducing
a product that is novel to one market, but not novel globally. However, they point out that
their definition of entrepreneurship does not include typical innovative efforts in a
competitive environment such as innovative cost-cutting. They state that under their
definition of entrepreneurship, all innovation is not entrepreneurial, only innovation that
produces novel products or services.
Various leading scholars have responded to the Ramoglou and Tsang (2016) article
in the Dialogue section of AMR. Further, Davidsson (2017) responded with an article in
Journal of Business Venturing Insights. All of the critique of the Ramoglou and Tsang
(2016) article concerns philosophical points, not an objection to the requirement for novel
products or services. Consequently, much of the entrepreneurship research community
apparently concurs with the concept that entrepreneurship requires a novel products or
service.
Looking at entrepreneurship through another lense, often entrepreneurship
researchers put entrepreneurship into two categories: (1) Schumpeterian; and (2)
2

Kirznerian (Foss & Klein, 2010; Shane, 2003). The term Schumpeterian entrepreneurship
is named after the economist Joseph Schumpeter and refers to entrepreneurship that arises
out of some type of change, usually technological but possibly political, economic, or
social change (Schumpeter, 1934; Shane, 2003). A classic example of Schumpeterian
entrepreneurship is an entrepreneurial pharmaceutical firm inventing and commercializing
a new breakthrough drug.
The term Kirznerian entrepreneurship is named after the Austrian economist Israel
Kirzner and refers to entrepreneurship concerning alertness to arbitrage type opportunities- no technological or societal change required (Shane, 2003). Under the Kirznerian
definition, entrepreneurship is the act of discovering, or being alert to, opportunities that
others fail to realize. It often contains an element of surprise (Kirzner, 1997). The
discovery entails discovering an opportunity that was right under the nose of everybody,
but everybody failed to recognize before now (Kirzner, 1997). A classic example of
Kirznerian entrepreneurship is an entrepreneur inventing a simple new product that leaves
many kicking themselves, saying “why didn’t I think of that”.
The Kirznerian notion of entrepreneurship as defined by modern scholars does not
absolutely have a strict requirement of a novel product or service like the modern concepts
of creation and actualization, but it certainly includes and anticipates ventures with creative
new products (cf. Foss & Klein, 2010; Shane, 2003). Similarly, while Schumpeterian
entrepreneurship as defined by modern scholars arguably could include a venture with a
launch other than a launch with a technologically innovative new product, the innovative
new product launch is certainly a focus of the modern Schumpeterian entrepreneurship
definition (cf. Foss & Klein, 2010; Shane, 2003).
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Arguably, the emphasis on novel products and services in the literature is
justifiable by theory. Alvarez and Barney (2007, p.14) cite Barney (1986) in opining
theory that “In a setting where everyone could potentially become aware of and exploit an
opportunity, it would be difficult for anyone to generate sufficient profits from actually
producing new products or services.” In other words, it is difficult to make money in a
competitive market. This difficulty in a competitive market arguably makes founders of
businesses in competitive markets less interesting than founders with novel products or
services.
Research Results That We Know
With the emphasis on firms launched with novel products and services, a critical
event of entrepreneurship is discovering a novel product or service. Also, a critical point
in time is when the discovery is made.

In the modern entrepreneurship literature,

entrepreneurship has been defined as the discovery, evaluation and exploitation of
opportunities to introduce future goods and services

(Venkataraman, 1997).

This

definition highlights the importance of the discovery of a novel product or service because
exploitation (benefitting from) follows their discovery.
Following this logic,

there has been extensive research concerning the

characteristics of the persons who launch these firms with novel products or services.
There has been over two decades of research concerning the differences between these
entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs (Alvarez &Barney, 2007; Busenitz & Barney, 1997).
What We Do Not Know
In the modern entrepreneurship literature, regardless of whether one is talking about
discovering, creating, actualizing, Schumpeterian or Kirznerian, there are two basic themes
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to the literature: (1) a new product or service and (2) avoiding competition. Kirznerian
entrepreneurs avoid competition via arbitrage conditions.

The usual Schumpeterian

entrepreneurs avoid competition via technological innovation. The competition avoidance
meshes well with the theory of both (1) Alvarez & Barney (2007) and (2) Barney (1986)
that it is hard to make money on a venture when many can see the venture opportunity.
Certainly, it is advisable to avoid competition when possible. However, it is not
always possible to avoid competition. I argue that it is difficult, if not nearly impossible to
do so in most situations. Usually, it is necessary to face competition if you want to start a
firm. There has not been extensive research in the modern entrepreneurship literature
concerning business founders who enter competitive markets with no novel product or
service.
Theory says that entrepreneurial opportunities arise from change such as
technological, political, cultural, legal and social change (Schumpeter, 1934). Yet, there
has not been extensive research concerning business founders utilizing recently developed
technology to develop ventures dependent on the new technology in a competitive
environment.
It is common knowledge that most business startups fail. Although there has been
extensive research into the distinctions between entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs, there
has not been research into the distinctions between successful entrepreneurs and failed
entrepreneurs.
Important issues in resource-based (RBV) theory are how entrepreneurs source
heterogeneous and hard to copy resources and capabilities to develop sustained competitive
advantage (Barney, 1991). There has not been extensive research into the sourcing of
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heterogeneous resources needed by business founders in competitive markets to attain
sustainable competitive advantage (cf. Barney, 1991).
Entrepreneurship literature focuses on innovation to develop new products to avoid
competition. However, there are other types of innovation. Byers, Dorf and Nelson (2010)
define radical innovation or disruptive innovation as creating new products or services - what the entrepreneurship research has covered. They define incremental innovation as
characterized by faster better or cheaper versions of existing products or services, either an
improved version of the product or service, better delivery of the same product or service,
or offering the same product or service at a better price. The business founder in a
competitive environment performs incremental innovation and this type of innovation has
not been covered extensively in the entrepreneurship literature.
Research Question
I define one term to set up my research question. The startup firm entering a
competitive market competing on incremental innovation does not fit well into either the
Schumpeterian or Kirznerian category. I argue it is really a third type of entrepreneurial
firm. This firm really does not create, discover or actualize anything because it does not
have the “novel” product or service contemplated in the literature. It does not benefit from
being alert to opportunities that others did not see, and it does not have a technologically
innovative new product.
I realize that this type of business founder is outside the scope of some researchers’
definition of entrepreneurship. Arguably, depending how broadly Schumpeterian and
Kirznerian entrepreneurship is defined, this firm could fit under one of those definitions.
However, under the recent AMJ Ramoglou and Tsang view, the firm falls completely
outside the definition of entrepreneurship.
6

I refer to this type of a business founder as a performance entrepreneur. The
performance entrepreneur really does not discover an opportunity or anything at all because
he or she is either: (A) pursuing the same opportunity that (1) the incumbent competition
is already pursuing while operating in plain sight and/or (2) other entrepreneurs are
planning to pursue; or (B) attempting to sell a product or service invented by a third party.
Further, the performance entrepreneur really does not exploit any opportunity, but rather
he or she (1) competes for market space in a competitive environment or (2) attempts to
market a new product or service developed by a third party.
In this dissertation, I investigate how prevalent performance entrepreneurship firms
are in the ranks of US IPO firms that (1) have not created or developed new products, but
(2) do have a business model that depends on technology recently developed by others. An
example of this could be an entrepreneurial retail firm formed to compete in a soon to be
crowded market selling and installing new technologically innovative products developed
and manufactured by a third party. Specifically, my main research question is:
In the ranks of US IPO firms, how prevalent are performance
entrepreneurship firms that have a business model that depends on new
technology recently developed by others?
Recent entrepreneurship research has focused on innovative new products and
services as the key to entrepreneurial success.

The business founder who enters a

competitive market is viewed as less attractive, almost certainly not a good enough
candidate to achieve the pinnacle. I question and investigate that thinking. While classic
economics says that competitive markets do not have high profit potential, I investigate
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how often performance entrepreneurs break through barriers and achieve extraordinary
profits in competitive environments.
Few would doubt that there are numerous performance entrepreneurship
opportunities that are not high growth opportunities such as local house painting, bakeries,
handyman services, car washes and lawn services. This is obvious and beyond dispute.
By looking at IPO firms, I investigate (1) whether it is really necessary to have an
innovative novel offering to reach the pinnacle of entrepreneurship, an IPO (Shane, 2003),
or (2) whether performance entrepreneurs often reach this pinnacle.
Traditional Research
While the performance entrepreneur may have been neglected in modern research,
the performance entrepreneur is present in the traditional research. This emphasis in the
modern literature for a novel product or service is a departure from early entrepreneurship
research, including Schumpeter’s thinking.

Schumpeter had a broad definition of

entrepreneurship that did not require a novel product or service.

His definition of

entrepreneurship included not only introducing new products, but also new production
methods, new sources of supply and new industrial combinations (Schumpeter, 1934,
1939, 1942). Thus, while new innovative production methods to reduce costs is not
entrepreneurial under Ramoglou and Tsang’s definition, they are under Schumpeter’s
definition of entrepreneurship. Apparently, modern researchers have narrowed the scope
of entrepreneurship.
The modern narrowing of the study of entrepreneurship is not only inconsistent
with Schumpeter, but other early entrepreneurship scholars as well.

For instance,

Cantillion (1755) viewed the entrepreneur as a person motivated by profit to engage in
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arbitrage by buying at a certain price and selling at an uncertain price. Later, Menger
(1871) viewed the entrepreneur as a capitalist and manager who: (1) assesses the economic
landscape; (2) makes economic calculations and predictions about potential business
activity; (3) willfully sets planned business activity into motion; and (4) supervises the
business activity.
Mises (1949) viewed the entrepreneur as a speculator attempting to make a profit
off his/her opinions about future economic circumstances. None of these scholars require
entrepreneurship to involve a novel product or service. Even more recently, Shane (2003)
had a definition of entrepreneurship that did not require a new product or service offering
by the entrepreneurial firm.
Research Question Importance
This is an important issue. In order for the field of entrepreneurship to advance,
empirical research concerning entrepreneur activity in discovering/selecting ventures is
needed (Shane, 2016). This study is such research. Moreover, the prevalence of the
performance entrepreneur may shine a light on an important entrepreneur who has been
ignored in the modern entrepreneurship research.
Performance entrepreneurship may be more profitable than theorized. Performance
entrepreneurs may be more prevalent among the ranks of highly successful entrepreneurs
than expected.

The performance entrepreneur, although neglected in most modern

research, is part of the entrepreneurship family in the traditional literature. These are
important areas of research that are currently not researched.
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The field of entrepreneurship cannot advance until an understanding is developed
of what entrepreneurs actually do (Aldrich & Ruef, 2019). This dissertation performs
important work towards that mission.
Examples of Performance Entrepreneurship
I want to point out some examples of highly successful performance entrepreneurs
to help motivate interest in the study of performance entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs
did not have innovative novel products or services when they started, but instead mostly
(1) competed on price or (2) competed with an arguably better version of an existing
product already on the market.
Sam Walton built his Walmart empire without any innovative, clever new products
dreamed up in a Kirznerian moment of brilliance. He sold his products through the same
basic channels (brick and mortar stores) as the competition and sold the exact same
toothpaste, laundry detergent and paper towels as the competition. The Amazon history is
similar, it started out selling the exact same music, books and videos as the competition in
a new method (e commerce) that was being attempted by many.
Apple did not invent the PC. Instead, it came out with an improved version of the
PC which sold well. There were multiple PCs on the market before Apple appeared.
Microsoft’s early history is similar - - not innovative new and different products, but better
versions of existing products.
Google did not invent the search engine. Twelve other firms had search engines up
and running before Google. VC firms passed on investing in Google because Google was
a late comer entering an already crowded market with more competition yet entering.
Google succeeded because it had a better version of an already existing service.
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Facebook’s history parallels Google’s. Facebook did not invent social media. When
Facebook started, My Space had a dominant market share which Facebook had to
overcome. Certainly, these are cherry picked examples of firms. This dissertation will
explore if they are outliers, or if they are mainstream in the ranks of IPO firms.

11

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Definitions
To streamline the rest of the dissertation, I introduce three more definitions. I
assign two classifications to every firm: (1) a classification based on its own activity; and
(2) a classification based on the technological environment in which it operates. I define
three terms to describe the activity of entrepreneurial firms:
(1) tech-maker entrepreneurship;
(2) Kirznerian entrepreneurship; and
(3) performance entrepreneurship.
Every firm in the sample will have one or more of these three classifications.
Tech-maker entrepreneurship is entrepreneurship by a firm involving a new
product or service offering based on technological innovation accomplished by the firm
itself. A firm designing, developing, manufacturing and selling a new high-tech widget is
an example of tech-maker entrepreneurship.

Kirznerian entrepreneurship is

entrepreneurship involving a new product offering that was possible without new
technology developed by the firm. In these definitions, new means not offered before in
the market.
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Performance entrepreneurship concerns entrepreneurship involving a firm (1)
selling the same basic product or service as the competition or (2) selling a new product or
service developed by a third party.

It is not necessary that the performance

entrepreneurship firm achieves any level of performance excellence, only that the firm
strives for market share while competing on (1) price, (2) quality, (3) service or (4) product
differentiation (better features of an existing product that are obviously desirable).
Separate and distinct from this classification based on firm activity, I provide a
second classification of firms based on their technological environment. I have two
classifications for the technological environment of firms.

The term tech-enabled

entrepreneurship means efforts of a firm that require recent technological innovations
developed by others, not the firm itself. A firm selling and installing or servicing a new
high-tech widget recently developed by a different firm is an example of tech-enabled
entrepreneurship. Recent means widely available for the benefit of the firm or its customers
no more than eight years before firm founding. Eight years is a number I selected based
on the amount of time it could take a firm to recognize an opportunity and procure
necessary resources for a firm.

The alternative calculation the tech-enabled

entrepreneurship is simply not tech-enabled.
In Chapter III, I will place boundaries around these terms so that they can be
measures in my hypotheses testing. Figure 1 depicts the different classifications.
______________________
Insert Figure 1 about here.
______________________
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Figure 1 depicts (1) the three classifications that a firm can have for its own conduct,
(2) the two classifications that a firm can have based on its environment, and (3) the
possible interactions of these classifications. The three circles represent the three types of
ventures based on firm activity: tech-maker, Kirznerian and performance entrepreneurship.
Under any of these classifications, a firm is also classified as either (a) tech-enabled or (b)
not tech-enabled. I use the vertical line to segregate (a) tech-enabled and (b) not techenabled ventures, with each circle having the two separate regions (half circles) designated
with capital letters.
Firms in the spaces to the right of the vertical line are tech-enabled firms (in spaces
B, D or F); and firms to the left of the line are not tech-enabled firms (in spaces A, C or E).
Performance entrepreneurship firms do not overlap Kirznerian and tech-maker
entrepreneurship firms because they do not have new products or customer delivery
methods that they developed themselves, and the other firms do. The horizontal line in
Figure 1 is a border between firms that do and firms that do not have a new product or
customer delivery method that they developed themselves. The firms that are the main
subject of the research question are in space F. In space F, the firms have not developed
any new product offering, but their business model depends on recent technological
developments of others.
Resource-Based View
The theory developed herein is grounded in the resource-based view (RBV) of
strategy. A focus of resource-based view strategy is competitive advantage which is
defined as the accumulation of idiosyncratic, costly (or impossible) to copy resources
controlled by a firm that give a firm competitive advantage (Barney, 1997).
14

When possible, a firm should strive to achieve and maintain sustainable competitive
advantage which is defined as a value-creating strategy that a firm is implementing (1) that
is not being simultaneously implemented by the competition and (2) wherein the
competition and potential competition are not able to duplicate the benefits arising out of
the strategy (Barney, 1991).
A firm goal under RBV is to acquire a collection of resources that are worth more
collectively than the cost of acquiring the individual resources (Barney, 1986). The
development of operations and marketing know-how in a new market can be a critical part
of this effort
While the term resources includes tangible goods and cash, it also includes
knowledge, information, know-how, skills, goodwill and other intellectual property.
Acquiring sustainable competitive advantage usually involves a combination of multiple
types of resources.
Performance Entrepreneurship Prevalence
Firms in a performance entrepreneurship venture generally compete on product
quality, marketing and/or price. Business opportunity can arise from operating efficiency
of operations (Hammer and Champy, 1993; Hammer & Stanton, 1995; Hammer, 1996;
Hammer, 2001; Hammer, 2004; Hammer & Hershman, 2010;). Under RBV, firms can
create value by accumulating the resources to function efficiently. Michael Hammer
(2004, p. 84) describes an example of a firm achieving success without an innovative new
product:
In 1991, Progressive Insurance, an automobile insurer based in Mayfield
Village, Ohio, had approximately $1.3 billion in sales. By 2002, that figure
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had grown to $9.5 billion. What fashionable strategies did Progressive
employ to achieve sevenfold growth in just over a decade? Was it positioned
in a high-growth industry? Hardly. Auto insurance is a mature, 100-yearold industry. . . Did it diversify into new businesses? No, Progressive’s
business was . . . consumer auto insurance. Did it go global? Again, no...
Neither did it grow through acquisitions or clever marketing schemes. For
years, Progressive did little advertising, and some of its campaigns were
notably unsuccessful. It didn’t unveil a slew of new products. Nor did it
grow at the expense of its margins, even when it set low prices. . . The
company’s growth has not only been dramatic—it is now the country’s third
largest auto insurer—it has also been profitable.
. . . By offering lower prices and better service than its rivals, it simply took
their customers away. And what enabled Progressive to have better prices
and service was operational innovation, the invention and deployment of
new ways of doing work.
Hammer defines the term operational innovation which is narrower than the term
performance entrepreneurship. However, operational innovation is a possible component
of performance entrepreneurship, probably a dominant component of performance
entrepreneurship. Going back further in time, Progressive is an example of performance
entrepreneurship because the whole business plan of Progressive from the start was to sell
the exact same automobile insurance as the competition to certain high-risk drivers, but at
a better price than the competition.
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A term commonly used to describe competing on operational innovation is faster
better cheaper. The three terms have been used in a variety of orders such as faster cheaper
better (Hammer & Hershman, 2010). . Hammer (2004) predicted that the pursuit of faster
better cheaper would be the driving force of the modern economy. Hammer (2004) opined
that a central force in business innovation will be the quest for operational innovation. In
other words, competition to be faster, better and/or cheaper than the competition, not
necessarily competition to come up with a clever new product.
A fact of US life in modern times that drives this desire for faster better cheaper is
global competition. Particularly competition from countries with low cost labor, driving
down pricing of goods. Moreover, the global competition adds actors competing for
customers, thereby intensifying price competition.
Another factor that drives down the cost of goods and services and thereby creates
a resulting need for faster better cheaper is the knowledge of consumers (Hammer, 1997).
The modern consumer today can easily compare pricing and features of goods and services
on the internet in ways that were not possible 30 years ago. Under these circumstances,
there is intensified price competition creating a need to be price competitive, and in turn
creating a need for faster better cheaper. Commercial purchasers now enjoy the same
technology.
Yet another factor is increased competition via the internet. Before the internet,
usually if a consumer wanted to buy an item, the consumer usually bought it from a local
merchant, and the local merchants competed with each other. Now in the age of the
internet, often the consumer can buy the item from a local merchant, or a variety of e
commerce vendors. The e commerce vendors come from around the globe. The local
17

merchant now has to be competitive with the new actors, thereby tightening price
competition and in turn creating a need for faster better cheaper.
Hammer (2004) considered operational efficiency as a source of opportunity in the
modern economy for two more reasons: (1) corporate management weak spots; and (2)
rapid technological innovation. Hammer (2004) considered operations as a possible
weakness in large established firms because their leadership is often dominated by
marketing and finance people, not operations people. This weakness arguably enables
opportunities for performance entrepreneurs to compete against firms with operations
challenged management by employing faster better cheaper efforts.
Entering an established market is difficult. However, if the management of the
incumbent firms in an industry are not operating efficiently, there can be entrepreneurial
opportunities for a new firm operating efficiently.

Under Hammer’s view, these

opportunities may exist frequently because of management steeped in marketing and
finance skills, but not operations skills.
Further, Hammer (2004) envisioned rapid technological innovation enabling
operational efficiency and thereby enabling business opportunities based on the newly
available technology enabled efficiencies.

Changed circumstances resulting from

technological advances often mean that what was the most efficient way to do things
yesterday is no longer the most efficient way today because tasks can be done more
efficiently today with the new technology. Rapidly changing technology means rapidly
developing opportunities for performance entrepreneurs.
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All these opportunities enabled by corporate weak spots, rapidly changing
technology and the market conditions described above are opportunities for the
performance entrepreneur. The quest for faster better cheaper creates entrepreneurial
opportunity at two levels. First, there is opportunity for an entrepreneurial firm to excel
by making its own operations efficient. Second, there is opportunity for an entrepreneurial
to launch ventures improving the efficiency of their clients. These are opportunities ripe
for performance entrepreneurs.
Although seldom mentioned in the recent entrepreneurship literature, a recognized
basis for entrepreneurial opportunity is decreasing costs of production (Fiet 2002).
Holcombe (2003) places factors that generate entrepreneurial opportunities in three
categories: (1) factors that disequilibrate the market; (2) factors that enhance production
possibilities; and (3) entrepreneurial activity that creates other entrepreneurial opportunity.
Holcombe’s second category - - factors that enhance production - - is not limited to
manufacturing. He gives a financial services example to illustrate the point. Before
modern low cost, long distance transmission of voice and other data, it was not practical to
have low cost, national brokerage chains. With the advent of low-cost data transmission,
low cost national financial service firms developed.
Hammer’s views are consistent with: (1) Holcombe’s second source of
entrepreneurial opportunities: factors that enhance production possibilities; and (2) Fiet’s
view that lowering costs is a source of entrepreneurial opportunity. Hammer’s operational
innovation is a factor that enhances production capabilities - - one of Holcombe’s factors.
Hammer’s view that innovation will drive operational efficiency is also consistent with
Fiet’s view that lowered costs is a source of opportunity.
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An analysis of the prevalence of performance entrepreneurship (“PE”) firms among
IPO firms requires a brief discussion of tech-maker (“TM”) and Kirznerian (“KN”) firms.
The prevalence of PE firms among IPO firms equals PE/(PE+TM+KN). Consequently,
the prevalence performance entrepreneurship firms requires at least some analysis of the
number of tech-maker and Kirznerian firms. They are part of the equation. Below is a
brief discussion of why the number of Kirznerian and tech-maker firms may not be
increasing.
In order to make it to the IPO stage, generally a firm has to attain significant success
and lasting sustainable advantage. I submit that Kirznerian ventures will seldom reach the
IPO stage because the arbitrage opportunities that Kirznerian ventures rely upon often are
short lived and therefore do not generate the possibility of a sustainable competitive
advantage.
Arguably, tech-maker firms making the IPO ranks should be outnumbered by
performance entrepreneurs making the IPO ranks. A single technology breakthrough can
generate multiple entrepreneurial opportunities (cf. Schumpeter, 1934). This multiplier
effect suggests that tech-maker firms should be outnumbered by performance firms.
Moreover, some theory says that technological innovation is becoming the domain of large
established corporations, not entrepreneurial firms (Acs & Audretsch, 2003; Schumpeter,
1942; Galbraith, 1956). This shift could further reduce the number of tech-maker firms.
Additionally, funding is becoming more of an issue for tech-maker firms.
Entrepreneurs must obtain financing to realize their opportunities (Baeyens and Manigart,
2003). The dominant funder of high growth tech-maker firms - - VC firms - - are starting
to shy away from tech-maker firms (Ewens et al., 2014; Kerr &Nanda, 2014, Kerr et al.,
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2014). CVC is partially filling the void from reduced VC funding for tech-maker firms,
but it does so with takeover motives cutting off IPO attainment for some acquired firms
(Basu et al., 2011; Benson and Ziedonis, 2010; Chesbrough, 2002, Dimitrova, 2015;
Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2006, Dushnitsky, 2012; Dyer, Kale and Singh, 2004; Hellmann,
2002, 2005; Ivanov& Xie, 2010; Kaplan & Stromberg, 2004; Masulis and Nahata, 2011;
Rohm, 2018; Wieland, 2005). The reduced funding arguably reduces the number of techmaker firms achieving an IPO.
Considering: (1) Hammer’s view and other circumstances arguably driving up the
number of performance entrepreneurship firms; as well as (2) possible downward pressure
on the number of tech-maker firms resulting from decreased funding and increasing
complexity; and (3) arguably lackluster potential opportunity for the Kirznerian firm to
reach the IPO stages, I propose this hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Most firms that make it to the US IPO stage are firms pursuing
performance entrepreneurship ventures, not Kirznerian or tech-maker ventures.
I submit that the performance entrepreneur is the dominant form of highly successful
entrepreneurs.
Tech-enabled/Performance Entrepreneurship Prevalence & Potential Success
Next, I narrow my focus from all performance entrepreneurs to a limited subset of
performance entrepreneurs. I look at the performance entrepreneurs who operate in a techenabled environment - - the subjects of the research question. Under the definitions of this
dissertation, they are tech-enabled performance entrepreneurs.
The high growth of firms reaching the IPO stage enable extraordinary returns for
early investors. Under the resource-based view (RBV), extraordinary returns generally are
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not possible unless there is considerable uncertainty regarding the value of the inputs (Amit
& Shoemaker, 1993. Barney, 1986, 1988). High risk in early investment in firms that
achieve high-growth enables extraordinary returns.
The tech-enabled environment contains considerable uncertainty about the value of
the inputs. A tech-enabled venture can be selling or using a new technology. Regardless
of whether the tech-enabled opportunity is to (1) utilize a new product or service enabled
by recent technological innovation or (2) sell a new product or service enabled by recent
technological innovation, there is considerable uncertainty. There is not only the
uncertainty about market acceptance of the new product or service, but also uncertainty
about the reliability of the new product or service.
There is risk that the new technology that worked fine in the laboratory before going
to market does not work fine when put to use in the real world. Further, there is uncertainty
about the practicalities of everything involved with the product or service. Also, there is
uncertainty about the ability of the entrepreneur to perform as necessary with the new
technology.
In the tech-enabled/performance entrepreneurship setting, often the entrepreneurial
opportunity is obvious to those skilled in the subject discipline. Consequently, many firms
enter the market space in swarms and then there is competition between the firms on either
cost/price and/or product differentiation (cf. Schumpeter, 1939). In this type of competitive
environment, the firms that prevail in this competition are the firms that can establish a
sustainable competitive advantage in cost and/or product differentiation (Porter, 1985).
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A key component of a developing sustainable competitive advantage is learning
(Porter, 1985). The firms that generally learn the fastest and learn the most information
develop a competitive advantage (cf. Porter, 1985; Holcombe, 2013). The acquired
information and knowledge cannot generate extraordinary returns for investors unless it is
knowledge and information that the firm has but not its competitors (Barney, 1986, 1988).
This concept explains the high-growth opportunities that exist in tech-enabled ventures. If
a firm wants to enter a mature market with established actors, the firm is usually behind
the established actors in terms of information and knowledge about the specific market.
The new entrant faces a major challenge trying to get ahead of the establish actors in terms
of knowledge and information about the specific industry.
Conversely, in the tech-enabled scenario, there are no established actors
participating in the market space. Consequently, a firm that can learn faster than the other
novices it is competing against can develop a sustainable competitive advantage. Due to
the lack of established actors with established customers, a firm in the tech-enabled space
can achieve high-growth and resulting extraordinary returns for its investors if it learns the
nuances of the market faster than the competition. . Thus, in a tech-enabled market a firm
can achieve high-growth and reach the IPO pinnacle even though it does not have in
innovative new product or service that it developed. This is true even if the firm is in a
competitive environment. Competing in a new market without established actors is
considered a blue ocean strategy as opposed to a more difficult red ocean strategy with
blood in the water from fights with established actors (Kim & Maubourgne, 2005). Kim’s
and Maubourgne’s (2005) theory says blue ocean strategy is more profitable than red ocean
strategy.
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All this theory concerning the opportunity for tech-enabled/performance
entrepreneurship firms, and faster better cheaper leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2: The prevalence of US IPO firms pursuing ventures that are both
performance ventures and tech-enabled ventures is growing.
Hypothesis 3: A substantial percentage of US IPO firms are firms pursuing
ventures that are both performance ventures and tech-enabled ventures.
Simply, markets recently enabled by technology will produce opportunity for rapid growth.
Theory Summary
The entrepreneurship literature has tended to focus on the idea of an innovative
entrepreneur developing a novel product or service to create wealth. However, the
entrepreneur who does not have any innovative new product or technology that he/she
developed, but utilizes new technology developed by others, may be more common and
profitable than realized. A key entrepreneurial skill may be to execute/perform/operate
better than the competition in competitive markets recently enabled by technological
innovations of others. The better performance may be grounded in operational excellence,
better customer service, better pricing or other factors. In this setting, entrepreneurial talent
is needed to adapt to and utilize the finer points of the new technology.
Stratified Research
I acknowledge that IPO firms are not a representative or generalizable sample of
entrepreneurs. However, IPO firms are some of the most successful entrepreneurial firms,
if not the most successful. Entrepreneurship scholars consider attaining an IPO as the
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pinnacle of entrepreneurship (Shane, 2003). My interest is not in the entire population of
entrepreneurs, but rather in the highly successful entrepreneurs. Various estimates are that
about 70 or 80% of business startups fail. Many firms that survive are making low profit
levels or no real profit at all. My research does not concern entrepreneurial firms that failed
or marginally profitable firms. I want to look at the nature of ventures pursued by
successful entrepreneurs.
Analyzing IPO firms is an excellent way to test my views concerning the dominant
type of highly successful entrepreneurship. The pinnacle goal of a VC firm is (1) to invest
in an entrepreneurial firm by providing both capital and management advice and then (2)
cashing out with a large payout in an IPO or otherwise (Leach & Melicher, 2015, 2018).
VC investment strategy suggests that the typical entrepreneurial firm to invest in by a VC
fund is an entrepreneurial firm on the cutting edge of technology attempting some
breakthrough - - a firm attempting to proceed in a tech-maker venture. Therefore, by
looking at IPO firms, I am looking at the very group of firms that is assumed to be (A)
tech-maker ventures, not (B) tech-enabled performance ventures.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Database for Sample of Firms
The first step of my research was selecting a random sample of IPO firms. To assure
that I had a database of a rather complete list of firms to randomly select from for my
sample, I selected firms from a database of US IPO firms provided to me by Martin Kenney
and Donald Patton dated 2017 and titled: Firm Database of Emerging Growth Initial Public
Offerings (IPOs) from 1990 through 2015.
After I randomly selected firms from the database for my sample, I had to go
elsewhere to obtain necessary detailed information about the firms in my sample
concerning firm activity and firm environment. The main source for detailed specific
information concerning firm activity and firm environment was SEC filings (primarily S1 forms) of firms that went through a US IPO during the 1995-2015. I will discuss the
Kenney and Martin database before moving on to a discussion of the S-1 forms.
The thoroughness and completeness of this list of firms in Kenney and Martin’s
Firm Database of Emerging Growth Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) from 1990 through
2015 is explained by the authors. Table 2 is a series of excerpts from a document prepared
by the authors to explain the database development, history and breadth of firms included
they titled “Guide to the Firm Database of Emerging Growth Initial Public Offerings
(IPOs)from 1990 through 2015.”
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_____________________________
Table 2 goes about here
_____________________________
While the database is a result of exhaustive research to gather all relevant firms, it
excludes firms going through the IPO process that were not emerging growth firms such
as mutual funds and real estate investment trusts (REITS). These restrictions on entry into
the database are explained by the authors in Table 3, another set of excerpts of “Guide to
the Firm Database of Emerging Growth Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)from 1990 through
2015.”
_____________________________
Table 3 goes about here
_____________________________

Table 4 is a list of variables in the database, also from “Guide to the Firm Database of
Emerging Growth Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)from 1990 through 2015.”
_____________________________
Table 4 goes about here
_____________________________

Measures
There were six key measures in my research. In terms of activity by the subject
firm, there will be four possible measures
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Kirznerian venture – An entrepreneurial venture involving: (1) a
significantly different (novel) product, service or customer logistics than
previously offered by the competition; that (2) would not be possible but for
the alertness to existing market conditions, possibly an element of surprise,
by the firm to develop the significantly different product, service or
customer logistics.
tech-maker venture – An entrepreneurial venture involving: (1) a
significantly different (novel) product, service or customer logistics than
previously offered by the competition; that (2) would not be possible but for
a technological, change developed by the firm.

Any such technical

invention/innovation must be sophisticated enough to require specialized
experience or training in the applicable art of the invention to develop it.
Kirznerian and tech-maker venture – A venture meeting the criteria of
both categories.
performance venture - A venture to sell (A) the same basic products or
services (possibly with improved features) as the competition through the
same customer logistic channels; competing on basis of faster or otherwise
preferable delivery, better price, better quality, or an improved version of
the product or service or (B) a new product developed by a third party.
In terms of technological environment, specifically the availability of recent
technological innovations available to the firm, each firm will have one of two
classifications:
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tech-enabled venture – A venture that would not be possible but for: (1) a
technological invention/innovation/change developed by a third-party and
available to the entrepreneur and/or its customers as need be no more than
the eight years prior to the firm founding.
not tech-enabled venture– Not a tech-enabled venture, not a venture that
meets the requirements to be a tech-enabled venture.
I classified a firm as tech-maker or Kirznerian if it made any claim at all of such
applicable accomplishment in its SEC filings. I classified a firm as tech-enabled only if its
business model absolutely required a new technology by a third party. An example of this
would be a one product firm bringing a new drug to market that has been licensed to it by
a large pharmaceutical firm.
Extracting Data from SEC Documents
The main SEC document that I reviewed was S-1 filings. It is a reliable source of
information. Every firm going public must file an S-1 (or an SB-1 for small businesses)
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prior to its initial public stock
offering (IPO). The S-1 is a requirement for all firms going public, except certain small
firms can instead file an SB-1 which is a slightly simpler version of an S-1. Both forms
contain more than adequate information for the purposes of this dissertation. As explained
below, the information relied upon by me from the SEC forms tends to be very reliable.
The IPO has two effects on a firm going public. First, it provides the firm with
capital for continued expansion. Second, after the IPO, the equity stakes of both
management and other pre-IPO investors, (subject to certain lock-up delays) becomes
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liquid. Management and other pre-IPO investors usually agree not to sell their stock until
a period after time after the IPO and this is referred to as a lock-up period.
In return though, the firm must conform to the reporting and transparency
requirements imposed by the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933. The Securities Act of
1933 requires companies making a public offering of their securities to publicly disclose
relevant business and financial information about their company so that potential investors
can make an informed investment decision regarding the offering. Specifically, the 1933
Act requires companies going public to file disclosure documents with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the most important of which are the general form S-1 registration
statement1 and the 424B prospectus.
For my research, there were two key sections of the S-1 that I reviewed: (1) the
general business description; and (2) the required disclosure of risks for the investors.
Critically for my research, the risk disclosures set forth risks that bear on my tech-enabled
determination such as reliance on a third party’s technology. These risk disclosure
statements in the S-1 must be accurate, or else the firm and its officers could be subject to
civil penalties or even criminal penalties for securities fraud.
I will present details of one S-1 statement in this section to illustrate the value, depth
and accuracy of an S-1. I will use a firm called Macrogenics’ S-1 to illustrate the features
of the S-1 form. The S-1 forms had a standard format to them. They all had a similar table

1

From this point forward, I will generically use the term S-1 to mean both S-1 and SB-1

forms. Both forms contain the same relevant information for purposes of this
dissertation.
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of contents. Below is a sample table of contents from the S-1 for a company called
Macrogenics:
Prospectus Summary
Risk Factors
Special Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements
Use of Proceeds
Dividend Policy
Capitalization
Dilution
Selected Consolidated Financial Data
Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations
Business
Management
Certain Relationships and Related Party Transactions
Principal Stockholders
Description of Capital Stock
Shares Eligible for Future Sale
Material U.S. Federal Tax Consequences for Non-U.S. Holders
Underwriting
Legal Matters
Experts
Where You Can Find More Information

1
11
44
46
47
48
50
52
54
76
122
136
137
141
146
148
152
159
159
159

Although the order varies somewhat, the S-1s all have the same items in their table
of contents. For purposes of my research, the three sections I used were (1) Prospectus
Summary, (2) Risk Factors and (3) Business. The rest of the sections contain a wealth of
information for investors but usually were not relevant to my research.
The first section that I always looked at was the Prospectus Summary. An excerpt
of Macrogenics Summary is below:
We are a clinical-stage biopharmaceutical company focused on discovering
and developing innovative monoclonal antibody-based therapeutics for the
treatment of cancer and autoimmune diseases. We generate our pipeline of
product candidates from our proprietary suite of next-generation antibody
technology platforms, . . . The combination of our technology platforms and
antibody engineering expertise has allowed us to generate promising
product candidates and enter into several strategic collaborations with
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global pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. These collaborations
provide us with funding and allow us to leverage the additional expertise of
our collaborators to advance the development of our product candidates.
This summary is not proof of, but suggestive of, two things: (1) even though it is a
pharmaceutical company, it may not be a tech-maker because of the description of itself as
“clinical stage” and because of its collaborations and (2) it may be tech-enabled because of
the collaboration agreements.
The Risk Factors section of the S-1 reveals more information. One warning is:
We may be unable to obtain orphan product designation or
exclusivity for some or all of our product candidates. If our
competitors are able to obtain orphan product exclusivity for their
products that are the same as our product candidates, we may not
be able to have competing products approved by the applicable
regulatory authority for a significant period of time.
Each warning such as this one is followed by a lengthy discussion of the risk.
The quest for orphan drug status does not prove, but suggests that this may be a
circumstance of an IPO firm developing products invented by a large pharmaceutical firm
because this arrangement is common with orphan drugs. In the pharmaceutical context,
the term develop generally means take an already patented product through FDA testing.
Often, the IPO firm is a firm that has no function other than taking a product through the
FDA process after a large firm or university has invented the product, not a tech-maker
inventing its own product. In this scenario, the IPO firm usually sells or otherwise passes
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off the manufacturing, distribution and sale of the product; and might not even do its own
FDA (clinical) testing. It is basically a financing vehicle for the FDA testing.
The following warnings suggest that might be the case here - - not a full-fledged
cutting-edge technical firm developing breakthrough technology - - in the language of this
dissertation, not a tech-maker
Our existing therapeutic collaborations are important to our business,
and future collaborations may also be important to us. If we are
unable to maintain any of these collaborations, or if these
collaborations are not successful, our business could be adversely
affected.
This warning suggests the possibility that the firm may not be the actual inventor of their
product if it has collaboration agreements to do R&D testing for other firms.
Independent clinical investigators and CROs that we engage to
conduct our clinical trials may not devote sufficient time or attention
to our clinical trials or be able to repeat their past success.
Thus, the firm had only one function, clinical testing, and it contracted even that out.
The following disclosures show the firm had no manufacturing or sales capabilities,
and was even relying on third parties to manufacture.
We expect to contract with third parties for the manufacture of our
product candidates for clinical testing in the future and expect to
continue to do so for commercialization. This reliance on third parties
increases the risk that we will not have sufficient quantities of our
product candidates or products or such quantities at an acceptable
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cost, which could delay, prevent or impair our development or
commercialization efforts.
We currently have no marketing, sales or distribution infrastructure.
If we are unable to develop sales, marketing and distribution
capabilities on our own or through collaborations, we will not be
successful in commercializing our product candidates.
Failure of our third party contractors to successfully develop and
commercialize companion diagnostics for use with our product
candidates could harm our ability to commercialize our product
candidates.
We have incurred significant losses since inception and anticipate
that we will continue to incur losses for the foreseeable future. We
have no products approved for commercial sale, and to date we have
not generated any revenue or profit from product sales. We may
never achieve or sustain profitability.
The following warnings demonstrate the financial risks of the firm.
We will require substantial additional funding, which may not be
available to us on acceptable terms, or at all, and, if not available,
may require us to delay, scale back, or cease our product
development programs or operations.
The following warning suggests that the firm may not be working with a new
product, but improvement to products that others already have. At a minimum, it strongly
suggests that the products are not Kirznerian.
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We face significant competition and if our competitors develop and
market products that are more effective, safer or less expensive than
our product candidates, our commercial opportunities will be
negatively impacted.

The following warnings suggest that the firm may not have a truly new product,
only an improvement to an existing product. Moreover, an improved version that is actually
designed by and invented somebody else, the licensors of the patents the firm operates
under.
We face significant competition and if our competitors develop and
market products that are more effective, safer or less expensive than
our product candidates, our commercial opportunities will be
negatively impacted.
If any product liability lawsuits are successfully brought against us or
any of our collaborators, we may incur substantial liabilities and may
be required to limit commercialization of our product candidates.
If we fail to comply with our obligations under our intellectual property
licenses with third parties, we could lose license rights that are
important to our business.
There generally cannot be competition for a new product.

Moreover, collaborators

generally cannot be liable unless they are the inventors of the product. The patent licenses
section indicates the firm is operating with products developed by third parties, not their
own.
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The firm started when the patented inventions of others that it was using were new
technology of others, so it was classified as tech-enabled for its environmental
classification.

It would be tempting to not classify the firm as performance

entrepreneurship instead of tech-maker for its activity, but one part of the S-1 form
indicated it should be classified as a tech-maker.
One of the warnings provides:
If we are unable to obtain and enforce patent protection for our
product candidates and related technology, our business could be
materially harmed.
The firm’s business model included possibly obtaining patents for combinations of others’
inventions. Since the proposed business model includes patenting some processes learned
from the FDA testing by combining inventions of others, I classified this firm as a techmaker. Of note, a patent can be obtained for combinations of already patented inventions
of others, and that appears to be the case here. A patent holder of an invention combining
patented inventions of others cannot make his or her patented product without licenses
from the underlying patent holders, but he or she has the exclusive rights to use the patented
invention, unless he or she grants licenses for others to use it.
The firm could be profitable without getting the intended patents. However, since
the firm had patents figured in its projected business, I classified it as a tech-maker. I
followed my classification rule that a firm is classified as a tech-maker or Kirznerian firm
if it has any claim of having a new product, service or customer logistics. This firm was
not classified as Kirznerian because it was attempting to develop a product with an obvious
demand that others were attempting to develop.
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I illustrated the S-1 format with this pharmaceutical firm for five reasons. First,
pharmaceutical firms were the most difficult to classify. Also, the pharmaceutical firm
example shows the rich information that can be gleamed from an S-1 form. Third, it is an
example of the methodological nature that I went through to classify firms. Fourth, it
showed my emphasis and rigor to classify firms as a category contrary to the hypotheses I
proposed. Fifth, it shows the collaboration of entrepreneurial firms with large firms, a point
not discussed in the entrepreneurship literature.
Sample
To test the hypotheses, I developed a sample of ventures that went through an initial
public offering in the U.S. market during 1995-2015. Given that IPO markets experience
major fluctuations and considering that there is no such thing as a “typical” IPO year, the
time frame selected spans through different periods of IPO activity levels. For example,
there was a boom in IPOs leading up to the Dot Com Boom in 2001 and a real decline in
IPOs after the 2008 Financial Crisis. For my sample, I gathered a sample at a minimum
525 firms selected from my data source (minimum of 25 per year) from the list of firms in
the time period. These firms were randomly selected.
I classified firms in the sample as (1) performance entrepreneurship firms, (2)
Kirznerian firms and/or (3) tech-maker firms based on their activity. Further, I classified
them as tech-enabled ventures or not tech-enabled based on their technological
environment.
For Hypothesis 1, I looked at the prevalence of performance entrepreneurship firms
in comparison to the prevalence of firms with the other alternative classifications.
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For Hypothesis 2, I ran regression analyses to assess whether there were significant
increases in the prevalence of firms that are both performance entrepreneurship firms and
tech-enabled firms. Further, I compared groups of firms from the same different time
periods using to see if there are differences between the groups. For Hypothesis 3, I looked
at the prevalence of tech-enabled/performance entrepreneurship firms.
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CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH RESULTS
I randomly selected firms to produce a sample with 25 or more firms for each of
the years 1995 – 2015 except for two years. Two of the years in that timeframe had less
than 25 IPOs involving emerging growth firms as defined above. The year 2008 had only
ten such IPOs and 2009 had only 14 IPOs. From these two years, I put all the firms going
through IPOs in my sample. Thus, 2008 had only 10 firms in the sample and 2009 at only
14 firms in the sample. An explanation of my random selection process is described in
Table 5.
Once the sample was selected, I assigned each firm two classifications. As outlined
above I assigned each firm a classification based on the firm’s activity and a second
classification for its technological environment. Next, I computed the prevalence of the
different classifications in each of the years 1995 – 2015.
Generally, I expected a low prevalence of performance entrepreneurship firms in
the early years (1990s) with the prevalence of the performance entrepreneurship firms
growing over the 21 years. This expectation is inherent in my hypotheses. This expectation
was based on an assumption that turned out to be wrong. I believed that the faster better
cheaper phenomenon was just starting in the early years and had growing momentum over
the 21 years. Thus, I expected a low prevalence of performance entrepreneurship firms in
the early years and a high prevalence in later years.
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The research results support the expectation of a high prevalence of performance
entrepreneurial firms in later years. However, the results contradict the expectation of a
low prevalence performance entrepreneurship firms in the early years of the sample.
Looking at Figures 2-4, it can be seen that there are no real trends over the timeframe.
Table 6 is a summary setting forth the prevalence of the different classifications of
firms for each year. As indicated in Table 6, the prevalence of performance
entrepreneurship firms was already high in 1995 at 85%.

This high percentage of

performance entrepreneurship had a temporal aspect to it. From 1995 to 2000, the ranks of
the IPO firms were dominated by firms getting into ventures related to the new technology,
the Internet. These firms were not firms attempting to develop new technology, but instead
firms attempting to build businesses around use of the technology.
However, even after the dot.com bubble burst in 2001, the prevalence of
performance entrepreneurship firms remained high. At the same time, the prevalence of
tech-maker firms remained low. Figure 2 is a chart showing the prevalence of tech-maker
firms for each of the years and Figure 3 is a chart showing the prevalence of performance
entrepreneurship firms. Figure 4 is a chart showing the prevalence of tech-enabled/
performance firms. The chart shows that the prevalence of these firms remained relatively
steady.
Going beyond the sample for this dissertation and considering the actual percentage
of tech-maker firms among the population of all firms in the winter in IPO in the timeframe
1995 – 2015, the 16.0% figure inflates the actual percentage of tech-maker firms. This is
because the annual numbers of IPO firms in the earlier stages of the 1995 – 2015 timeframe
were large compared to the annual number of firms in the later years and the percentage of
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tech-maker firms were low in the early years. An accurate assessment of tech-maker firms
would require a weighting of the samples for the various years in this would drive down
the percentage of tech-maker firms because there were large numbers of IPOs in the early
years of the time frame while at the same time there were very low percentages of techmaker firms
Looking at figure 2, one can see that there is no decline in tech-maker firms over
the sample timeframe. Actually, there is a slight uptick in the prevalence of tech-maker
firms in the last three years of the sample timeframe. This increase was driven by a surge
in pharmaceutical IPOs. In the 2013 – 2015 timeframe, roughly 35% of the IPOs were
pharmaceutical. I briefly looked at material on this surge and could not find a concrete
reason for this surge. Business journals suggested one of two reasons for the surge: (1)
recent scientific breakthroughs in genetics that are available to the public have generated
new pharmaceuticals based on the recently developed genetic science; and (2) portions of
the VC industry gearing up with extra pharmaceutical expertise to invest in pharmaceutical
firms. Regardless, prevalence of tech-maker firms remained low averaging 26%.
The percentage of tech-maker firms (26%) is lower than the percentage of
pharmaceutical firms (35%) for two reasons: (1) not all pharmaceutical firms are techmaker firms - - some market drugs invented by other parties under patent licenses or
assignments from the inventors; and (2) almost all tech-maker firms are in the
pharmaceutical space.
There was a real variety of performance entrepreneurship ventures. The lineup
included coal mines, sand mines, gold mines, oil producers, natural gas producers, natural
gas processors, natural gas transporters, commercial banks, consumer banks, mortgage
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companies, insurance companies, brick and mortar retailers and wholesalers, steel
manufacturers, contract manufacturers, homebuilders, clinics, temporary staff agencies,
outsourcing operations, medical groups and others. The IT venture was the most common
type of performance entrepreneurship venture.
Three technologies were the most common source of tech-enabled ventures: (1)
genetic science, (2) fracking technology and (3) far and away the most common, the
internet. Genetic science was behind many of the pharmaceutical firms. While better than
half of the pharmaceutical firms were
The tech-maker venture category was dominated by pharmaceutical firms. Some
of the pharmaceutical firms were not classified as tech-maker because they were marketing
drugs invented by others. It is relevant to note that pursuant to my measures, if a firm made
any claim at all of having a hand in inventing a product, I classified it as tech-maker.
Interestingly, many of these tech-maker firms were working in collaboration with
large pharmaceutical firms.

It sometimes was not clear who was the real inventor

(originator) of the subject product when the IPO firm was collaborating with a big pharma
firm on research. Consistent with my scoring guidelines, I scored these unclear situations
as tech-makers, even though they may not have really been tech-makers. Consequently,
the real prevalence of tech-maker firms may be lower than reported in the results for this
reason.
The risk disclosures show a strong link between Big Pharma and the entrepreneurial
firms. The following risk disclosure by an IPO firm Neose discloses the tightness of this
link that occurred repeatedly in the pharmaceutical setting:
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Dependence on Abbott; Dependence on Other Collaborative Partners. The
Company’s strategic alliance with Abbott provides, in part, for the receipt by
the Company of certain license fees, milestone payments, and, if
commercialization occurs, royalty payments. The Company has derived
substantially all of its revenues to date from its strategic alliance with Abbott
and anticipates that payments from Abbott will constitute all or substantial
portion of its revenues for the next several years.

I classified this firm as a tech-maker, even though it had its research funded by Abbott,
had plans to have Abbott market its drugs and had all of its revenue received from
Abbott. Following my classification rules, I classified it as a tech-maker because it was
inventing its own products.
With some IPO firms though, the nature of the alliance and collaboration
precluded a tech-maker designation. The risk disclosures of an IPO firm Ventrus
confirmed it did not have a product that it developed on its own. This disclosure
confirms that it was not the inventor of its only products:
Our license agreement with S.L.A. Pharma is subject to termination if this
offering is not completed by September 30, 2010 or if a third party wishes
to license VEN 307 and VEN 308 in certain events.
We have in-licensed the rights to VEN 307 and VEN 308 from S.L.A.
Pharma. Pursuant to a December 18, 2009 amendment to the license
agreement between us, in the event we do not complete this offering by
September 30, 2010 with net proceeds of at least $10 million, S.L.A.
Pharma may terminate the license agreement immediately. In addition,
S.L.A. Pharma may terminate the license agreement with one month’s
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notice in the event that a third party wishes to enter into a license agreement
for VEN 307 and VEN 308, provided that within that 30-day period we have
not paid all then required payments under the agreement and provided
further that S.L.A.
This disclosure shows the control that big pharma exerts over the entrepreneurial IPO
firms. Big pharma provides various resources, but with strict conditions.

The evidence does support Hypothesis 1 (that the majority of firms reaching the
IPO stage are in fact performance entrepreneurship firms, not tech-maker or Kirznerian).
Performance entrepreneurship firms were 83.0% of the firms, tech-maker firms were
15,9% and Kirznerian firms were 1.9%. The prevalence of Kirznerian firms was very low.
During most years, the sample of firms did not contain any Kirznerian firms. This average
in the sample overstates the average percentage of Kirznerian firms (both inside and outside
the sample) because of the large number of firms reaching IPOs in the early stages of the
1995 – 2015 timeframe and the high percentage of performance entrepreneurship firms
during the early stages.
I ran z tests to assess whether or not the data is strong enough to say with confidence
that the percentage of performance entrepreneurship firms is actually greater than the
percentage of Kirznerian firms or tech-maker firms. First, I performed a two sample z test
to compare the means of (1) the percentage of performance entrepreneurship firms and (2)
the percentage of tech-maker firms. The null hypothesis for this test was that the two means
were equal. At a 99% confidence level, the null hypothesis that the two means are the same
was rejected (p < .01). The figures for this test are set forth in Table 8.
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Next, I ran a test comparing the percentage of performance entrepreneurship firms
and the percentage of Kirznerian firms. Similarly, I set the percentages of the two types of
firms being equal as the null hypothesis (p < .01). At a 99% confidence level, the null
hypothesis that the two means are the same was rejected. The figures for this test are set
forth in Table 9. Thus, the testing does not contradict a conclusion that the prevalence of
performance entrepreneurship firms (at roughly 83%) is greater than the prevalence of
tech-maker firms (at roughly 16%) and the prevalence of Kirznerian firms (at roughly 2%).
The data did not support Hypothesis 2 (that the prevalence of firms that are both
tech-enabled and performance entrepreneurship firms is growing). As previously
discussed, contrary to expectations, the prevalence of performance entrepreneurship firms
was very high at the beginning of the timeframe. Also, at the outset of the timeframe, the
prevalence of tech-enabled firms was substantial (42% on average). This percentage is
much higher than the percentage of tech-maker firms (16%) and Kirznerian (2%).
However, the data does support Hypothesis 3 (that prevalence of firms that are both
tech-enabled and performance entrepreneurship is substantial). The prevalence of techenabled firms was substantial (42% on average). This percentage is much higher than the
percentage of tech-maker firms (16%) and Kirznerian firms (2%).
To summarize the findings of the data, overarching conclusions that can be reached
concerning IPO firms in the timeframe are:
a. the majority of the firms are performance entrepreneurship firms in the
sample (approximately 83%);
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b. tech-maker firms are a small percentage of the firms (approximately 16%)
in the sample;
c. Kirznerian firms are only a very small percentage of the firms
(approximately 2 or 3%);
d. the percentage of tech-enabled firms is high (approximately 49%) in the
sample; and
e. firms that are both tech-enabled and performance entrepreneurship firms are
not a majority of the firms, but they are a substantial percentage of the firms
(approximately 40%) in the sample.
Contrary to expectations, there were not trends of increasing prevalence of techenabled firms, trends of increasing prevalence of firms that were both tech-enabled and
performance entrepreneurship firms, or trends of decreasing prevalence of performance
entrepreneurship firms. At the beginning of the subject timeframe, there are already was
(1) a high prevalence of tech-enabled firms and performance entrepreneurship firms
coupled with (2) a low prevalence of tech-maker firms.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Theory Contributions
This dissertation extends the entrepreneurship literature and theory five ways. First,
it brings to light a critically important role that entrepreneurs play in bringing benefits of
technological advances to society. Although this study does not support the view a view
that entrepreneurs are frequent inventors of new technological breakthroughs, it highlights
a critical role that entrepreneurs play in bringing technological advances to society. Quite
often, the underlying inventors of technological breakthroughs lack expertise in developing
the many beneficial uses of its technology. Entrepreneurs feel a critical role by utilizing
their niche expertise to bring the benefits of the novel technology to their respective niche
markets.
Second, this dissertation extends the entrepreneurship theory by taking a broader
look at innovation and shining light on a type of innovation not extensively covered in the
modern entrepreneurship literature - - the innovation of faster better cheaper - - incremental
innovation.
Entrepreneurship literature focuses on innovation to develop new products to avoid
competition - - radical innovation or disruptive innovation which is creating new products
or services However, I note that there are other types of innovation. Another type of

47

innovation, incremental innovation is characterized by faster better or cheaper versions of
existing products or services, either an improved version of the product or service, better
delivery of the same product or service, or offering the same product or service at a better
price. These results of this dissertation suggest that incremental innovation may be a
common, if not the dominant, innovation utilized by entrepreneurs. This type of innovation
has not been covered in the entrepreneurship literature.
Third, this dissertation brings rare empirical evidence to the theoretical debates on
the efforts of entrepreneurs to launch ventures. Despite extensive attention paid to the
theoretical debate concerning the origins of entrepreneurial ventures and how
entrepreneurs select ventures to pursue, empirical research on these topics remains limited.
This dissertation contributes new empirical evidence by looking at the ventures pursued by
entrepreneurial high-growth firms. By looking at 568 firms that have achieved highgrowth, this dissertation contributes to the literature by giving insight into what highgrowth firms actually do. The field of entrepreneurship cannot advance until an
understanding is developed of what entrepreneurs actually do (Aldrich & Ruef, 2019).
This dissertation contributes to the entrepreneurship literature for a fourth reason –
– it points out the prevalence and profit potential of the performance entrepreneur. While
early scholars may have had definitions of entrepreneurship broad enough to include the
performance entrepreneur, the performance entrepreneur has been all but forgotten in the
entrepreneurship literature of the last 50 years. This dissertation brings the performance
entrepreneur back into the discussion of what entrepreneurship actually is. Finally, this
dissertation demonstrates what is not necessary to have a highly successful venture. An
innovative novel product or service is not needed.
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This dissertation also extends strategy theory. A critical issue in RBV strategy
research is how do firms purchase the resources they need at prices that allow them to
create a competitive advantage (Barney, 1986). Barney (1986) opines that the expense of
gaining information that is available to the competition does not fall into this category.
However, Barney does not offer information on how firms develop valuable information
that is private or exactly what it is. This dissertation contributes to strategy literature by
empirically showing examples of what the nature of such information can be for
entrepreneurs.
Further, this dissertation adds to economics literature by providing some empirical
research into Schumpeter theories that have not been tested extensively. Schumpeter
(1942) said that technological innovation would increasingly become the domain of large
established firms and this dissertation provides some empirical evidence to support this
theory. There were only a small percentage of IPO firms that claimed a technological
innovation. Schumpeter (1934,1939, 1942) opined that entrepreneurial opportunities arise
for entrepreneurial firms from exogenous change. Supporting this view of Schumpeter is
the data that over40% of the IPO firms had a business model that depended on recent
technological change.
Limitations
This dissertation has limitations. Although the research is longitudinal covering
the time period 1995 – 2015, there is a temporal nature to it. The economy is dynamic.
Changes to the economy in the future may render the conclusions of this dissertation
flawed. Further, this research is limited in geographic scope to firms achieving an IPO in
US markets. Although this restriction does not necessarily limit the sample to US based
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firms, it does severely limit the sample to US firms and foreign firms in which US investors
will invest. Firms from other countries may operate under different circumstances.
Another limitation is the sample size. Although it is relatively large (568 firms), it
could be larger. A larger sample size could produce different results.
The sample generated herein is not a generalizable sample of all entrepreneurs and
this is a limitation of the sample However, it is not intended to be a generalizable sample
of all entrepreneurs. It is certainly a generalizable sample of IPO firms in the 1995-2015
timeframe and it arguably generalizable to high-growth firms. Although this dissertation
may not tell you what is necessary to achieve success as a high growth firm, it surely tells
you what is not necessary - - a clever new product that nobody else thought of before.
Practitioner Value
This research has valuable information for the practitioner. For the aspiring
entrepreneur, it gives guidance on what type of venture to pursue, pointing out the lack of
a need for a novel product. Further, it can guide the aspiring entrepreneur to consider (1)
opportunities arising from technological change and (2) faster better cheaper opportunities.
Perhaps more importantly, it points out the danger of not keeping abreast of faster better
cheaper.
Future Research
This dissertation points to directions for future research. Future research could look
at change other than technological change generating entrepreneurial opportunities. In
reviewing the SEC filings, it became apparent that (1) change other than technological
change generates entrepreneurial opportunities and (2) a high percentage of successful
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entrepreneurs are taking advantage of some type of recent change. In the sample, I was
not looking for it, but I noticed other types of change frequently being the catalyst for
ventures. Future research can follow up in other ways.
First, future studies could look at the prevalence of tech-enabled/performance
entrepreneurship firms among non-IPO firms, particularly high-growth firms that do have
high-growth, but not enough growth to reach the IPO stage. Second, future studies can be
done to update the research in this dissertation.
Third, future research can be done to look at industries that enable high-growth
entrepreneurship. In the study, the overwhelming majority of tech-maker firms were in the
biotechnology space. Why does this industry spawn so many more IPO firms than the rest
of the industries? Is it economies of scale, regulations, taxes, risk/reward tradeoffs desired
by investors, location of talent or other factors?
Fourth, future studies could look at the skills required to be a successful techenabled/performance entrepreneur. Although there has been considerable research on the
entrepreneur/non-entrepreneur distinctions, there has not been extensive research on the
successful/non-successful entrepreneur generally, let alone the traits required to be a
successful tech-enabled/performance entrepreneur.
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Figure 2
Prevalence of Tech-maker Firms
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Figure 3
Prevalence of Performance Entrepreneurship Firms
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Figure 4
Prevalence of firms that are both Tech-enabled and Performance Entrepreneurship
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US Patents

Table 1
US Patents
Calendar
Year
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988

Utility
Patent
Applications
589,410
578,802
571,612
542,815
503,582
490,226
456,106
456,321
456,154
425,967
390,733
356,943
342,441
334,445
326,508
295,926
270,187
243,062
215,257
195,187
212,377
189,857
174,743
173,075
164,306
164,558
152,750
139,825

Design
Plant
Patent
Patent
Applications Applications
39,097
35,378
36,034
32,799
30,467
29,059
25,806
27,782
27,752
25,515
25,553
23,975
22,602
20,904
18,280
18,292
17,761
17,107
16,546
15,161
15,409
15,774
13,635
13,078
13,061
11,288
12,615
11,289

1,140
1,063
1,406
1,149
1,139
992
959
1,209
1,049
1,151
1,222
1,221
1,000
1,144
944
797
863
720
621
665
452
459
361
354
463
418
383
377
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Utility
Patents
298,407
300,678
277,835
253,155
224,505
219,614
167,349
157,772
157,282
173,772
143,806
164,290
169,023
167,331
166,035
157,494
153,485
147,517
111,984
109,645
101,419
101,676
98,342
97,444
96,511
90,365
95,537
77,924

Design
Patents

Plant
Patents

Patents
to Foreign
Residents

25,986
23,657
23,468
21,951
21,356
22,799
23,116
25,565
24,062
20,965
12,951
15,695
16,574
15,451
16,871
17,413
14,732
14,766
11,414
11,410
11,712
11,095
10,630
9,269
9,569
8,024
6,092
5,679

1,074
1,072
847
860
823
981
1,009
1,240
1,047
1,149
716
1,016
994
1,133
584
548
420
561
394
362
387
499
442
321
353
318
587
425

169,763
166,999
154,891
142,180
125,998
122,694
96,677
92,929
89,007
93,942
75,046
87,051
88,258
87,101
85,173
78,871
74,877
72,398
54,107
52,267
49,327
49,224
48,531
48,572
48,944
46,094
47,804
39,625

Table 2
Background and Breadth of Database

History of Database
This database is the product of many years of effort. Originally this project was directed to
parsing the IPO registration documents of just the semiconductor, biotechnology, and
telecom equipment IPOs from 1996 through 2000. Based on the research value of these
efforts (Kenney and Patton 2005, Patton and Kenney 2005), this work was expanded to
include all de novo IPOs from June 1996 through 2000.
A second effort was mounted to build a database from 2001 through 2006 with support from
the National Science Foundation – Geography and Regional Sciences (NSF 0647838). A third
stage to collect this data for the years 1990 through 1996 was completed with funding from
the Science of Science Policy program of the National Science Foundation (NSF 0915257).
Based on our work with Jay Ritter for the Kauffman Foundation on employment and revenue
growth of firms following their IPO (Kenney, Patton, and Ritter 2012), we have also extended
our database to include the time period from June 1996 through the year 2010. As part of our
ongoing research on IPOs and new firm formation we have recently expanded this database
to include the years 2011-2015. The database currently has data on 4,420 IPOs.

Completeness
This guide deals with the data about the firm going public and the offering itself, and is a
complete database of emerging growth, de novo firms going public on American exchanges
from 1990 through 20152. The format of this database is Excel.

Broad Definition
Our definition of emerging growth companies differs from the definition used in the 2012
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act. This bill defines emerging growth companies to
be any company with annual revenue of less than $1 billion. Our definition of emerging
growth companies is based on their status as de novo and is not based on their revenue at
the time of their IPO. Therefore, our definition includes the IPOs of Google and Facebook,
which are excluded under the definition in the JOBS Act.
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Table 3
Excluded Firms From Database

Restricted Firms
This database is comprised of all emerging growth initial public offerings (IPOs) on American
stock exchanges and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from January
1990 through December 2015. In assembling the set of firms to be included we relied on
Thomson Financial Venture Expert, SDC data, IPOScoop.com, and other sources to generate a
list of all IPOs over this time period. From this list the following types of firms and filings were
excluded: mutual funds, real estate investment trusts (REITs), asset acquisition or blank check
companies, foreign F-1 filers, firms that had gone public at an earlier time, and all spin-offs
and other firms that were not true de novo, emerging growth firms.
Data Reviewed to Determine if Restricted
Every firm going public must file a prospectus with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission prior to its initial public stock offering. The IPO is a defining event in the history
of any firm, and it performs two functions. First, it provides the firm with capital so that it can
continue its expansion. Second, after the IPO, the stakes of both management and investors,
(subject to certain lock-up delays) becomes liquid. In return, the firm must conform to the
reporting and transparency requirements imposed by the SEC under the Securities Act of
1933. One of the primary objectives of the Securities Act of 1933 is to require companies
making a public offering of their securities to publicly disclose relevant business and financial
information about their company so that potential investors can make an informed
investment decision regarding the offering. To achieve this end the 1933 Act requires
companies going public to file disclosure documents with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the most important of which are the general form S-1 registration statement
and the 424B prospectus.
This database has been constructed directly from these registration statements and
prospectuses. These documents were found on the SEC's Electronic Data, Gathering and
Retrieval (EDGAR) website. Up until the advent of the SEC's EDGAR system, IPO registration
statements and other SEC documents were filed in paper form in officially designated
locations and libraries. Beginning in the 1980s the SEC began to provide Internet access to
these documents through its EDGAR program, but it wasn't until June 1996 that public firms
were required to file all of their documents in this format. Therefore, a complete EDGAR
record of all IPO documents for firms going public only begins in June 1996.
For IPOs prior to June 1996 we have relied on IPO registration statements and
prospectuses that were originally found in paper form. These documents were found at the
Stanford Graduate School of Business Library in either pdf or TIFF format. It is from these
documents that the data for IPOs from January 1990 through May 1996 were obtained.
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Table 4
Variable Sources

Sources of Variables
This database contains variables that pertain to the firm going public and the offering itself.
Each firm is assigned a Central Index Key by the SEC which we are using as the firm's unique
identifier. All of the variables in this database are extracted from each firm's prospectus (form
424B) or the firm's registration statement (form S-1).
Main Variables Sources from SEC filings
Company ID: The firm's Central Index Key (CIK) assigned by the SEC. This is used as the unique
identifier of each firm in this database. If a firm was no longer publicly traded by the time
EDGAR was initiated, it would not have a CIK. In these cases, we assigned a unique ID to the
firm.
Company Name: Firm name at the time of the IPO.
IPO Year: The year of the IPO.
State of Incorporation: State of incorporation at the time of the IPO.
Company Street 1,
Company Street 2,
Company City,
Company State,
Company Zip:

The company’s business address.

Stock Symbol: The stock market symbol, or ticker, of the firm's stock.

Other Variables
SEC SIC: This is the 4 digit Standard Industrial Code (SIC) assigned to the firm by the SEC's
Division of Corporate Finance.
Primary SIC: This is the 4 digit SIC found in the firm’s S-1 registration statement. This is the SIC
the firm going public assigns to itself, and on occasion it does not agree with the SEC SIC.
Year Founded: This is the year the firm was founded.

64

Table 5
Random Selection Process

Random Selection Process for Selecting Firms in a Year
Step 1
Start with a list of the firms from database for that year in alphabetical order.
Step 2
Count the number of firms.
Step 3
If the number of firms is 25 or less, put all the firms in the sample.
Step 4
Determine if the number of firms can be divided by a number that results in a number
between 25 and 29 (plus a possible remainder). For example, if there would be 77 in the
sample, you could divide by 3 and get an answer of 25, remainder 2.
Step 5
If so, randomly select every nth firm in the list starting from the bottom. In the example of
77, you would start at the bottom and pick every 3rd firm.
Step 6
If not, if one dividing by one number produces too few and one number produces too many,
Divide by the number that produces too and randomly select the remaining firms from the
bottom of list.
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Table 6
General Results
Percentage of firms in the different classes

Year

Tech-maker

Performance
Entrepreneurship Kirznerian

Tech-enabled

Performance
Entrepreneurship
& Tech-enabled

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

14.8%
17.9%
11.1%
16.0%
0.0%
7.7%
6.7%
8.0%
7.7%
23.1%
18.5%
7.7%
32.0%
40.0%
7.1%
12.0%
8.6%
17.9%
28.6%
20.0%
29.3%

85.2%
82.1%
88.9%
84.0%
92.6%
92.3%
93.3%
92.0%
92.3%
76.9%
81.5%
88.5%
68.0%
60.0%
92.9%
88.0%
85.7%
82.1%
71.4%
80.0%
65.5%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
7.4%
7.7%
3.3%
4.0%
0.0%
0.0%
3.7%
3.8%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
5.7%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
5.2%

40.7%
53.6%
37.0%
44.0%
92.6%
80.8%
40.0%
36.0%
30.8%
57.7%
11.1%
23.1%
64.0%
40.0%
71.4%
60.0%
51.4%
64.3%
0.0%
56.0%
46.6%

37.0%
53.6%
25.9%
44.0%
92.6%
76.9%
36.7%
32.0%
30.8%
42.3%
7.4%
23.1%
52.0%
20.0%
57.1%
56.0%
45.7%
53.6%
28.6%
48.0%
31.0%

Avg.

15.9%

83.0%

1.9%

49.5%

42.6%
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Table 7
Prevalence of Tech-Maker Confidence Level

is
total sample
proportion is
conf level
proportion not
critical value
margin of
error
lower limit
upper limit

Tech-maker
91
568
16.0%
0.99
84.0%
2.576
0.039643726
12.1%
20.0%
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Table 8
Comparison of Tech-maker and Performance Entrepreneurship

Performance
Entrepreneurship
91
469
568
568
16.0%
82.6%

Tech-maker

alpha
p bar
q bar
z
p value

0.01
0.492957746
0.507042254
22.43239845
0.000000
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Table 9
Comparison of Kirznerian and Performance Entrepreneurship

Performance
Entrepreneurship Kirznerian
469
13
568
568
82.6%
2.3%
alpha
p bar
q bar
z
p value

0.01
0.424295775
0.575704225
27.37421129
0.000000
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Table 10
Comparison of Tech-maker and Tech-enabled/Performance Entrepreneurship

Performance
Entrepreneurship
& Tech-enabled
Tech-maker
240
91
568
568
42.3%
16.0%
alpha
p bar
q bar
z
p value

0.01
0.291373239
0.708626761
9.728894569
0.000000
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